Arbitrary refoulement

(Application no. 31428/18), 28 February 2019

Find here the communicated case.

Communicated case: 

• The applicant in this case complained that he that he would facea real risk of serious and irreversible harm under Article 3 of the Convention if he were to return to Bangladesh as a gay/bisexual man.
• ILGA-Europe together with the ICJ (International Commission of Jurists) and the UK Lesbian and Gay Immigration Group (UKLGIG) submitted the following:
  • There is a consistent approach in the case-law relating to Bangladesh as a country where imputation, suspicion, discovery or identification of someone’s sexual orientation or identity as LGBT is likely to give rise to a real risk of serious harm.
  • According to the ECtHR, treatment which is grounded upon a predisposed bias on the part of a heterosexual majority against a homosexual minority may, in principle, fall within the scope of Article 3. Under refugee law, prosecution may amount to persecution if the criminal law is enforced or punishment meted out in a disproportionate or discriminatory manner.
  • Concealment constitutes evidence of the objective well-foundedness of a subjective fear of persecution. Requiring coerced concealment of someone’s same-sex sexual orientation – as a way, purportedly, to mitigate the real risk of their being exposed to Article 3 prohibited treatment – constitutes pain and suffering amounting to proscribed treatment under Article 3 even if temporary. Mental harm resulting from fear of exposure to physical harm has been found by the ECtHR to constitute cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment. According to refugee law, in some cases psychological harm is persecutory.
  • Enforcing removals on the basis that the individuals concerned would be expected to conceal their sexual orientation would constitute arbitrary refoulement and thus violate Article 3 ECHR.

Refusal to provide services

(Application nos 51671/10 and 36516/10), September 2011

Find Court’s judgement here.

• In both cases the issue is the denial of services to members of the public because of their sexual orientation by a religiously-motivated individual. Ms Ladele, a marriage registrar, and Mr McFarlane, a relationship counsellor, refused to respectively carry out civil partnerships and counselling for same-sex couples, due to their Christian beliefs. Disciplinary sanctions were taken against them by their employers.
• Professor Robert Wintemute on behalf of ILGA-Europe, the International Commission of Jurists, and FIDH submitted the following:
  • Individuals providing good or services are not entitled to accommodation of their religious beliefs where they require that they exclude segments of society on the basis of personal identity characteristics such as sexual orientation. The right to manifest one’s religion is not absolute and may be circumscribed in the name of compelling objectives. Protecting the right of others to be free from discrimination is a legitimate limitation on the right to manifest one’s religion in the public sphere. It is necessary in a democratic society because the elimination of discrimination based on sexual orientation corresponds to a pressing social need.
  • This analysis is borne out by national law and practice which commonly deny such exemption to ensure the equal provision of goods and services to people regardless of sexual orientation.
• The European Court of Human Rights delivered its judgement in 15 January 2013.
• Following the same approach as interveners above, the Court held that there was no violation by the State of the applicants’ right to freedom of religion (Article 9 of the Convention). Its reasoning focused on the importance of balancing the right to freedom of religion with the public interest in providing non-discriminatory services and ‘ensuring that members of the public, regardless of their sexual orientation, are treated with dignity and have equal access to services.’

Social security rights

(Application No. 11313/02), 5 November 2008 

Find Court’s judgement here. (Complaint rejected as manifestly ill-founded)

• The applicant complained that, as a survivor of a same-sex couple who had had no means to achieve formal recognition of their relationship, he had been denied a benefit available to a survivor of a married couple.
• ILGA-Europe, together with FIDH, ICJ and AIRE Centre, submitted the following:
  • If the European Convention does not yet require equal access to legal marriage for same-sex couples, it is indirect discrimination based on sexual orientation to limit a particular right or benefit to married different-sex couples, but provide no means for same-sex couples to qualify. There is a growing consensus in European and other democratic societies that same-sex couples must be provided with some means of qualifying for rights or benefits attached to marriage.
  • The right to equal treatment requires that the State find alternative means to allow the survivor of a same-sex couple to receive Bereavement Payment. The adoption of the Civil Partnership Act should be seen as confirming that the previous situation, in which same-sex couples had no means of achieving official recognition of their relationship, was discriminatory.